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The "Race" for the Seabed:
The Right to Emplace Military
Installations on the Deep Ocean Floor
The emerging possibility for the emplacement of military installations on
the ocean floor presents a new area in which doctrines of international law
must be formulated to define those activities which are permitted to States
and those which are prohibited. The purpose of this paper is to examine
briefly the extent to which the existing body of international law is capable
of making this definition and to explore the directions which the devel-
opment of new doctrines to treat this new realm of activities appear to be
taking.
It is the author's basic thesis that the status of the deep ocean floor is as
yet largely undefined in international law and that the future definition will
be worked out as the synthesis of two competing pressures. On the one
hand there is the pressure generated by "state practice," which is in-
exorably being formulated as technology advances and States continue to
expand the scope of their military (and other) activities on the ocean floor
beneath deeper and deeper water. On the other hand there is the pressure
for some form of agreement, for multilateral regulation of the permissible
type and scope of installations which can be placed by individual States on
the ocean floor beyond the reach of present national jurisdiction. It appears
to the author that the advancement of technology and the concomitant
expansion of individual technologically advanced States into increasing
areas of the deep ocean floor will decrease the areas over which an
agreement establishing some degree of multilateral control can be estab-
lished. Thus it may be that by the time negotiations on a multilateral
agreement are begun, the deep ocean floor will already be sprinkled with
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submarine-monitoring devices, missile-launching sites, and other per-
manent semi-permanent military installations.
1.
The first problem in ascertaining the present state of the law regarding
the emplacement of such installations is to determine which are the areas
beyond the limits of any State's present jurisdiction. The seaward extent of
a State's exclusive rights in the ocean floor surrounding its coasts is now
governed by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.' Article 1
of this Convention states:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf' is used as
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Since the time of the adoption of the Convention, the dispute as to the
seaward extent of a coastal State's exclusive rights has turned primarily on
the meaning of the "exploitability" criterion contained in subsection (a).
The primary focus of the "exploitability" dispute has been on the distance
to which a coastal State can claim exclusive rights under Article 2 of the
Convention for the purpose of exploring its own continental shelf and
exploiting the natural resources thereof.2 The question of military rights in
the continental shelf has generally been treated as an adjunct of the ques-
tion of exploitation rights. Certainly if a State is accorded exclusive rights
in an area of the seabed for exploitation purposes, under the present state
1Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, 15 U.S.T. 47 1,
T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.2See, e.g., Burke, Contemporary Legal Problems in Ocean Development, paper present-
ed to the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI), Stockholm (1968);
Creamer, Title to the Deep Seabed, 9 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 205, 220-222 (1968);
Franklin, Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island (1959-1960);
Navpers 15031, Vol. LIII, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
(1961);
Griffin, The Emerging Law of Ocean Space, I INT. LAW. 548, 572-578 (1967);
Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 828 (1956);
McDOUGAL AND BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 663-691 (1962);
Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous Zone, II INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 131
(1962);
Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental
Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 631 (1958);
Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First Impression,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 735 (1958).
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of the law it is a relatively small step to include rights for military purposes
in the same area.
Some writers appear to feel that under the exploitability criterion a State
can now claim that its continental shelf extends to the middle of the ocean
floor. Professor Shiguro Oda of Japan argues: 3
... there is no room to discuss the outer limits of the continental shelf or any
area beyond the continental shelf under the Geneva Convention since ... all
the submerged lands of the world are necessarily parts of the continental shelf
by the very definition of the Convention.
Even some who oppose the extension of national jurisdiction beyond its
present effective limits concede that in fact the seabed can be made subject
to exclusive national jurisdiction through the process of national appropria-
tion. United Nations Ambassador Pardo of Malta, one of the leaders in
urging the United Nations to assume some form of jurisdiction over the
portions of the seabed which are as yet unclaimed, admits: 4
Unfortunately the present juridical framework clearly encourages, subject
to certain limitations, the appropriation for national purposes of the sea-bed
beyond the geophysical continental shelf.
Ambassador Pardo went on to discuss the extent of occupation by the
emplacement of installations (including military installations) which might
be considered sufficient to acquire exclusive jurisdiction to portions of the
seabed, and he drew an analogy to the "scramble for Africa" of the late
19th century, in which large portions of the inland area were claimed on
the basis of small settlements on the coastal strips. 5
On the other hand there are those who urge that the exploitability
criterion does not give States license to advance their claims to exclusive
jurisdiction further and further onto the unoccupied seabed as tech-
nological advances enable use of the ocean floor at greater and greater
depths. Professor Burke places emphasis on the "adjacency" requirement
of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, and he
states:6
... Everyone accepts the idea that the exploitability criterion is subject to
the limitations of adjacency.
However, he goes on to admit: 7
322 U.N. GAOR. A/C I/PV. 1515, 42 (1967).
41d., at 37.
5 1d.6Supra note 2, Burke.71d., at 33-34.
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.... To the present time there has been no authoritative impartial in-
terpretation of the 1958 Convention definition of the, shelf which would
establish what is meant by "adjacency," and prospects for obtaining one
quickly do not appear bright.
In the United Nations there is strong support for the position that the
seabed beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction is not open to
claims of national appropriation. A United Nations Committee considered
the possibility of regarding the ocean-floor as "res nullius and susceptible
of occupation" but rejected this possibility as only "theoretical." 8
In the U.S.A., the country which would stand to benefit most imme-
diately from the opening of the seabed to claims of national appropriation
based on occupation or exploitation, there is high-level support for the
proposition that the entire ocean floor is open to national claims. Dr. John
Craven, Chief Scientist of the Special Projects Office of the Department of
the Navy, and a lawyer, states:9
It is already established that emoluments of sovereignty or ownership
already obtain in the sea bed .... Granting the technology which has been
forecast here and using the latter of these definitions [the exploitability
criterion], it is clear that the ability to exert sovereign rights in the entire sea
bed has already received tacit approval.
Even within the U.S.A., however, there is support in the form of Senator
Claiborne Pell's Draft Resolution on ocean space 10 for a declaration that
the seabed beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction should not be
open to claims of national appropriation. And a spokesman for the military,
Dr. Frosch, favors curbs on the right of coastal States to claim exclusive
jurisdiction over large areas of the ocean floor, on the theory that it is
militarily advantageous to leave the largest possible area of the sea open
for the deployment of submarines."
Because of the pressure in the United Nations against unilateral exten-
sion of national jurisdiction through the mechanism of the exploitability
criterion or other means of occupation, it is the conclusion of the author
that the community of nations would not presently allow unilateral claims
8 U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/191Add.2 (1968).
9Craven, Sea Power and the Sea Bed, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 92,
No. 4, 49 (1966).
'
0 Resolution to express the sense of the Senate and the President should take all
necessary steps to enter into diplomatic negotiations to-the end that there shall be concluded,
with as widespread acceptance as is possible, a treaty on the peaceful exploration and
exploitation of ocean space and its resources, S. Res. 263, 90th Cong., 2d Session, March 5,
1968.11Frosch, Military Uses of the Ocean, paper presented at the Conference on Law,
Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean 2d, Ohio State University, Columbus,
Ohio, October 5-7, 1967, at 173-174.
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of exclusive jurisdiction over the deep-ocean floor to go unchallenged. In
view of the competing considerations within the United States.regarding.
the benefits and harms which could ensue from a series of national declara-
tions of exclusive jurisdiction any considerable distance beyond that
presently contemplated under existing national and international law, it
appears doubtful for the immediately foreseeable that the United States
will be the first country to make such a declaration.
2.
Assuming that there is some portion of the seabed which is not now
subject to exclusive national jurisdiction and which will not be made
subject to such jurisdiction by the emplacement thereon of exploitative or
other installations or by any of the customary modes of acquisition of
territory, 12 there is then the question of what rights any State has to
emplace military installations on such seabed beyond the limits of the
State's present jurisdiction. This is a question of much current debate in
the United Nations, and the information and doctrines educed in the
process of arriving at a consensus in that forum should be looked to as a
first source of evidence of current state practice and of likely directions of
evolution of the law regarding military installations on the deep-sea bed.
In 1967 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution
2340 (XXII)13 entitled:
Examination of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof,
underlying the High Seas beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction,
and the Use of their Resources in the Interests of Mankind.
Certain operative paragraphs of this Resolution stated:
The General Assembly,
1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction,
composed of 35 countries to study the scope and various aspects of this item;
3. Request the Secretary-General:(a) To transmit the text of the present resolution to the Governments of all
Member States in order to seek their views on the subject;
Pursuant to this Resolution the Secretary-General invited member Gov-
ernments to submit their views on the question, and thirty-four Govern-
12See, LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, eighth ed., 546-578 (1955).
I3G. A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 14; U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
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ments responded.' 4 The Committee established by paragraph 1 [hereinafter
referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee] put out a summary of the materials
thus collected,1 5 but at the time of the present writing it has not yet
published a report attempting to synthesize the divergent views into a
single statement of "state practice." This is understandable, since the
views submitted appeared to be based on States' views of their own best
interests as often as they were based on their views of present practice
under international law, and there is wide divergence among them.
Nonetheless it is possible to make certain generalizations from the material
thus far published which could be useful in indicating the directions in
which the law of the seabed is likely to evolve, either through state practice
or by multilateral treaty.
In the first place, States tended to view the problem of military use of
the seabed as part of the larger question of jurisdiction over the seabed for
all purposes. 16 Some States felt that the question of military use of the
seabed was "premature' 1 7 or "should properly be dealt with by the
agencies concerned with arms control and disarmament, in particular the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee."' 8 The Government of the
U.S.A. submitted a six-page memorandum in which it enumerated a list of
questions which the Ad Hoc Committee should review, but it was careful
not to commit itself on any specific proposals concerning the problem of
jurisdiction over the seabed or peaceful uses thereof.19 Other governments
were not so cautious. Finland, for example, may have felt that the pre-
clusion of military use of the ocean floor was already established in in-
ternational law, deriving from the principle of freedom of the high seas: 20
The Government of Finland wishes to emphasize that it does not accept
the exploitation of the ocean floor for military purposes in any form. Thus
would, inter alia, the principle of freedom of the high seas lose its practical
significance.
1 4U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/1 through A/AC. 135/10 (1968).
15 U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/12 (1968); see also U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/R.3 (1968) and U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 135/R.3/Add. I (1968).
'
6See, e.g., the memoranda submitted by the Malagasy Republic, Malta, Mexico, Sweden
and Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/1.2 (1968); the memorandum submitted by Italy, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 135/l/Add.2 (1968); the memorandum submitted by Japan, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.135/l/Add.3 (1968); the memorandum submitted by Greece, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.135/l/Add.7 (1968); and the memorandum submitted by Nigeria, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 135/l/Add.9 (1968).
17See, e. g., paragraph 3(c) of the memorandum submitted by the Canadian Government,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1 at 34 (1968).
18Cf. the memorandum submitted by the Government of the Netherlands, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.135/1 at 22 (1968).
19 U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1 at 12 (1968).20U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/l/Add.6 at 2 (1968).
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As a very rough generalization, the "underdeveloped" States which
submitted memoranda tended to be much more convinced than the more
highly industrialized States about the desirability of obtaining agreement on
a Convention which would define all States' rights in the seabed and which
would bar some or all military use of the seabed. Madagascar, for example,
stated:21
The Malagasy Government is of the opinion that the continental shelf
should not extend beyond a depth of 200 metres and that beyond that point
the ocean floor and its subsoil should remain res nullius.
The Sudan, Turkey and Dahomey were among the less developed coun-
tries which proposed some form of multilateral guarantee that the seabed
would be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. 22 The U.S.A. was
predominant among the States calling for further study of the problems
before any definite conclusion could be drawn. 23 Among the other devel-
oped States taking a cautious approach to the question of the conclusion of
a Convention were South Africa, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark,
Italy, Japan, Brazil and Greece. 24 Sweden was one of the few in-
dustrialized States which favored the conclusion of a Convention, and she
advocated a moratorium "aimed at freezing the present situation to avoid
claims on the ocean-bed and activities thereon-except scientific
ones-until the work of the Committee has been successfully brought to an
end. 25
3.
In view of the obvious and fundamental differences in the opinions of
States, it is the conclusion of the author that there is as yet no consensus as
to a prohibition in existing international law against the emplacement of
military installations on the deep-ocean floor. The Ad Hoc Committee has
noted that the ocean floor is apparently open to such installations as States
are capable of placing there, provided only that the installations do not
interfere with other legitimate uses of the ocean floor and of the high seas
above it. 26 Evidently States are in fact already engaged in the use of the
21U.N. GAOR, A/AC.135/I at 2 (1958).
22
.See, the memoranda submitted by the Sudan, Turkey and Dahomey, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 135/1 (1968).
23U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/l at 12 (1968).24 South Africa, the Netherlands and Canada, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1; Denmark and
Italy, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1/Add.2; Japan, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/I/Add.3; Brazil, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 135/l/Add.4; Greece, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/l/Add.7 (all 1968).
2U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1 (1968) and U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1/Corr.I (1968).2 6 Legal Aspects of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas beyond
the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of their Resources in the Interests of
Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/19/Add. 1, at 4 (1968).
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seabed for at least certain types of military equipment.2 7 Thus the author is
forced to agree with Professor Burke's statement that:28
Insofar as current practices in military use of the seabed are concerned, it
is quite difficult to derive conclusions because most such uses are not, for
obvious reasons, well advertised. Nonetheless, it is known that such use is
made and, to the writer's knowledge there has not been an instance of conflict
with other ocean uses, most of which would be surface or near-surface
operations. As far as we know, therefore, current operations can be under-
taken without any consequential interference with other uses and can, there-
fore, without much question be labelled as lawful.
At the same time it is obvious that there is pressure in the United
Nations and among publicists against extension of the arms race to the
ocean floor. A small step in this direction has already been made by the
prohibition in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty against the underwater testing
of nuclear weapons. 29 In addition to General Assembly Resolution 2340
(supra, page 7) and a 1969 Resolution replacing the Ad Hoc Committee
with a permanent committee, 30 there are draft resolutions on the reserva-
tion of the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. Among these are
a draft submitted by the U.S.S.R. entitled: "Draft Resolution on the
Prohibition of the Use of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of Territorial Waters for Military Purposes," 3 1 and a draft submitted
by the U.S.A. entitled: "Draft Resolution on Preventing the Emplacement
of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor." 32 There are also proposals such as that advanced by Malta for the
United Nations to assume "ownership" of the seabed and its resources
and to regulate access thereto for both exploitative and military purposes. 33
27See, e.g., Craven, Sea Power and the Sea Bed, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS,
Vol. 92, No. 4 (1966);
Craven, Technology and the Law of the Sea, paper presented to the Conference
on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean 1, Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio, March 17-18, 1967, Vol. 11;
Frosch, Military Uses of the Ocean, paper presented at the Conference on Law,
Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean 2d, Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio, October 5-7, 1967;
Michael, Avoiding the Militarization of the Seas, Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace, 17th Report, New Dimensions for the United Nations
39: 167 (1966);
See also The Military Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/28 (1968).281d., note 6, at 142.
29Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, done at Moscow August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963; 14 U.S.T.
1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
30G. A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) (1969).
3 1U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/20 (1968).32 U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/24 (1968).
3 3U.N. GAOR A/C.I/Pv.1515, 67; U.N. GAOR A/C.1/PV.1516, 2-5 (1967).
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The very proliferation of proposals is evidence of the variety of forms of
regulation which different nations consider desirable. It may be that an
eventual compromise will be worked out prohibiting the emplacement of
"offensive" weapons (such as nuclear-tipped missiles) while allowing the.
use of "defensive" equipment (such as submarine-tracking devices). How-
ever, at present the differences of approach, as shown in the titles of the
drafts submitted by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., may be one of the
principal obstacles in the way of the speedy conclusion of a treaty. Fur-
thermore, it does not appear likely that either of the super-powers will be
eager to yield the advantages offered by its present technological advances
to the control of the underdeveloped "third world" through the mechanism
of United Nations ownership or jurisdiction over the ocean floor. Thus it
may be some time before any multilateral restriction is imposed on States'
rights to make whatever military use they are capable of on the ocean floor.
It appears to the author that the propensity of States to continue to
develop the technological capability for the emplacement of military in-
stallations on the ocean floor at greater and greater depths will not be
altered by the mere possibility that an international agreement barring the
continued emplacement and perhaps the use of such installations may be
concluded in the future. It is only when such an agreement has actually
been signed that States will cease their present efforts to develop more
sophisticated ocean-floor equipment. Thus it is the conclusion of the author
that, in spite of the submission of the draft resolutions noted in the pre-
vious paragraph, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are engaged in what might
appear to be a race against the conclusion of an agreement forestalling the
further technological development and deployment of weapons and detec-
tion systems on the deep-ocean floor.
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